Impacts on Employment and Earnings by Decker, Paul T. et al.
Upjohn Institute Press 
Impacts on Employment 
and Earnings 
Paul T. Decker 
Mathematica Policy Research 
Christopher J. O’Leary 
W.E. Upjohn Institute 
Stephen A. Woodbury 
Michigan State University and 
W.E. Upjohn Institute 
Chapter 5 (pp. 151-174) in: 
Reemployment Bonuses in the Unemployment Insurance System: 
Evidence from Three Field Experiments 
Philip K. Robins, and Robert G. Spiegelman, eds. 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2001
DOI: 10.17848/9780880994217.ch5
Copyright ©2001. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
151
5






The findings presented in the previous chapter demonstrate that the
reemployment bonus offers in the Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washing-
ton bonus experiments generally reduced unemployment insurance
(UI) receipt.  Presumably, the reductions in UI receipt occurred
because the bonus offers induced claimants to return to work more
quickly than they would have in the absence of the bonus offer.  To
receive a bonus, claimants not only needed to stop receiving UI, they
also needed to prove that they held a job and that they held that job for
a minimum period of time.  We therefore expected, given the impacts
on UI receipt, to also observe an increase in employment and earnings
among claimants who received a bonus offer.  In this chapter, we exam-
ine employment and earnings during the year following claimants’
benefit applications to determine whether this impact occurred.
Although we expected the bonus offers to have positive impacts on
average earnings among all claimants, the reemployment incentives
generated by the bonus offers may have had potentially negative
impacts on the characteristics of new jobs held by claimants who found
a job.  Because the UI system provides financial assistance to claimants
who are looking for work, they can presumably be more selective in
taking a new job than they would be in the absence of UI.  Hence, UI
may lead claimants to spend more time unemployed because they are
searching for the best possible match between their skills and available
jobs.  The reemployment bonus creates an incentive to shorten search
time, however, which may cause claimants to be less selective in their
search, potentially resulting in a relatively less desirable match
between the claimant and the job.
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One way in which a less desirable job match might manifest itself
is through a lower rate of earnings on the subsequent job.  We therefore
extend our analysis of employment and earnings to examine the rate of
earnings among reemployed claimants and to test whether the bonus
offers, by promoting rapid reemployment, induced claimants to accept
lower-paying jobs.
Impacts of the bonus on the job match may also manifest them-
selves through changed rates of attachment to employers or to indus-
tries.  To speed reemployment, UI claimants who received a bonus
offer may have been more inclined to search for and accept jobs with
new employers or in different industries.  Greater employer or industry
switching might imply that job-specific or industry-specific human
capital possessed by claimants at their previous jobs was being aban-
doned to take advantage of the bonus offer.  If the specific human capi-
tal was still potentially productive, the abandonment of it would
represent a loss due to the reemployment bonus offer.  On the other
hand, if the specific human capital was no longer potentially produc-
tive, or if its potential productivity was not large enough to justify
longer unemployment spells, employer and industry switching may be
a benefit of the reemployment bonus offer.  This would be especially
true if claimants who switch employers or industries have more stable
employment in the long run than if they had not switched.  In this chap-
ter we test for the effects of the bonus offers on employer and industry
attachment by comparing the rates at which the treatment and control
groups returned to their previous employers or industries.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our analysis of the impacts of the bonus offers on employment and
earnings is based on two quarterly measures drawn from UI wage
records: 1) whether claimants reported earnings and 2) the amount of
earnings received.  The state UI wage records also contain direct data
on employment for the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments.
The Pennsylvania wage records report weeks of work in a quarter, and
the Washington wage records report hours of work in a quarter.  Using
these data, we constructed an employment indicator that specifies
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whether a claimant had either positive weeks of work in the quarter
(Pennsylvania) or positive hours of work (Washington).  Because the
Illinois records contain no direct employment data, we chose to use the
earnings indicator as a proxy for an employment indicator for most of
our analysis, so that we could investigate employment probabilities for
all three experiments.
For all three experiments, we have a full set of wage records data
on claimant earnings for the three calendar quarters following the
claimants’ entry into the UI system.1  We also examined data for the
quarter in which claimants filed their initial UI claims.  Although earn-
ings data for this quarter partly reflect claimants’ experience with pre-
UI employers, random assignment implies that pre-UI earnings during
this quarter should not vary significantly across treatment groups
within each demonstration.  Hence, any significant cross-group differ-
ences in earnings in the quarter of benefit application should be attrib-
utable to the impact of the treatment on postapplication earnings.  We
can also control for any remaining cross-group differences in pre-UI
earnings by controlling for base period earnings in our regression esti-
mates.
UI wage records were used because these data were available for
all three experiments.2  Although we believe that UI wage records are a
useful source of earnings data, they do have some shortcomings for our
analysis.  One important deficiency is that they are organized by calen-
dar quarter and thus cannot be used to isolate the impacts that occurred
immediately after the benefit application date.  This inflexibility may
be an important constraint, because previous studies of a reemploy-
ment bonus in the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration
Project showed that the impact of the bonus offer occurred soon after
the benefit application date (see Corson et al. 1989; Corson and Decker
1990).   In the present analysis, we attempt to address this shortcoming
by reporting estimates for the quarter in which claimants applied for
benefits, which encompasses the period immediately after the benefit
application date.
Another shortcoming is that a variety of factors may have affected
the accuracy of the wage records data.  For example, the wage records
exclude the earnings of claimants who were employed outside the state
or outside the UI-covered sectors (such as those who were self-
employed).  Because our analysis of earnings would include such indi-
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viduals as if their earnings were zero, the impact estimates would be
biased toward zero.  Furthermore, the UI wage records report earnings
when they are received, not when they are earned.  Claimants may have
received severance pay or pension payouts from their pre-UI employer
after they applied for UI benefits.  These payments could be misinter-
preted as earnings from a post-UI job, overstating the earnings received
by claimants following their benefit application date.3
We attempted to minimize the effect of potential shortcomings of
the wage records data by excluding extreme outliers—claimants whose
earnings were greater than $100,000 in any quarter of observation.
This restriction was intended to exclude high values that are caused by
severance payments or pension payouts.  The outliers may also be
caused by coding errors in the wage records.  The restriction on earn-
ings values affected the Washington data much more than the Illinois or
Pennsylvania data.  In Washington, 66 observations were excluded
from the data set because of this earnings restriction, compared with
only one observation each in Illinois and Pennsylvania.4
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS AMONG 
CONTROL GROUP MEMBERS
In the absence of the reemployment bonus, the control group
claimants in Washington had the highest employment rates after their
initial UI claims, followed by the Pennsylvania claimants and then the
Illinois claimants.  Because we had no direct employment information
on the Illinois claimants, we used the presence of individual earnings
during a period as a proxy for employment during the period.  The use
of earnings as a proxy for employment allows us to calculate employ-
ment rates for each experiment (Table 5.1).  The Washington control
group members were employed more than the Pennsylvania control
group members, who in turn were employed more than the Illinois con-
trol group members throughout the observation period.  We also
present the direct employment indicators for Washington and Pennsyl-
vania in Table 5.1.  They are consistent with the proxy measure in dem-
onstrating that the Washington control group tended to have higher
employment rates than the Pennsylvania control group.
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Table 5.1 Mean Employment and Earnings among Control Groupsa
The Washington control group members also had higher earnings
than the Illinois and Pennsylvania control group members.  Over the
four-quarter observation period, Washington control group members
earned an average of about $12,000, compared with $9,300 earned by
the Pennsylvania control group members and $7,400 earned by the Illi-
nois control group members.
 Two factors help to explain the differential earnings of the control
groups in the three demonstrations.  First, on average, the Washington
claimants were more highly paid than the Pennsylvania claimants prior
to their respective layoffs, and the Pennsylvania claimants were more
highly paid than the Illinois claimants (Table 2.5 in Chapter 2).5  We
Period of observation




UI claim 1 2 3
Sample
size
Claimants with reported 
employment (%)
Illinois NDc ND ND ND ND
Pennsylvania 84.1 59.0 67.3 70.6 3,353
Washington 81.7 65.9 70.5 72.0 3,082
Claimants with 
reported earnings (%)
Illinois 86.0 53.7 56.0 61.9 3,866
Pennsylvania 88.1 63.4 71.1 74.4 3,392
Washington 88.6 71.5 76.2 77.3 3,064
Earnings ($)d
Illinois 2,446 1,231 1,676 2,070 7,422 3,866
Pennsylvania 2,648 1,711 2,357 2,606 9,322 3,392
Washington 3,057 2,613 3,120 3,269 12,059 3,064
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
a The sample means presented in this table are not regression adjusted.
b Quarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after the UI
claim.
c ND = no data available.
d Excludes observations with earnings greater than $100,000 in any quarter.
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would expect that this difference in earnings would continue to exist as
claimants become reemployed, since the difference in base period
earnings at least partly reflects inherent differences in characteristics
(such as differences in skill levels) between the claimants in the differ-
ent states.  Second, Washington claimants appear to have become
reemployed more quickly than the Pennsylvania or Illinois claimants.
As shown in Table 5.1, the rate of employment for the three quarters
following the initial claim was highest for Washington claimants and
lowest for Illinois claimants.6  Since unemployed claimants received
zero earnings, the relatively low employment rates for the Pennsylva-
nia and Illinois claimants contributed to the relatively low earnings lev-
els experienced by these claimants.
ESTIMATED IMPACTS ON EMPLOYMENT 
AND EARNINGS
Estimates based on data from the UI wage records provide only
weak evidence that the bonus offers enhanced the employment of
claimants following their initial claim.  The clearest evidence of posi-
tive employment impacts can be seen for Illinois (Table 5.2).  The esti-
mated impact of the Illinois bonus offer on the probability of
employment is positive in each of the four quarters of observation.  The
impact is largest and statistically significant in quarter 2 (the second
full calendar quarter after the initial claim)—the bonus offer increased
the probability of employment by 3.9 percentage points, or by 7.0 per-
cent of the control group employment rate (56 percent) shown in Table
5.1.  The finding that the Illinois experiment had the clearest and larg-
est employment impacts is consistent with the findings on UI receipt
presented in the previous chapter, which showed that the Illinois exper-
iment had the largest impact on UI receipt.
The estimated impacts of the Pennsylvania and Washington bonus
offers on employment provide no strong evidence that the bonus offers
increased the probability of employment in those two states.  In Penn-
sylvania, only about half of the estimated impacts on the probability of
employment have a positive sign, and none of the impacts is signifi-
cantly greater than zero.  The combined impacts of the Pennsylvania
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SOURCE: State UI wage records.
a Individuals are treated as being employed in a quarter if the wage records contain
earnings data in that quarter.  The estimates are based on regressions that include
treatment indicators and other explanatory variables to control for claimant character-
istics, UI benefit parameters, and local factors. 
b Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; *** = statistically significant at the 99 percent
confidence level in a two-tailed test.
c Quarters 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after the ini-
tial UI claim.
d See Table 5.1.
e WBA = weekly UI benefit amount.
treatments demonstrate that the treatment group members had about
the same probability of employment as did the control group members
in each of the quarters.  In Washington, the majority of the estimated
impacts are negative, and none is significantly greater than zero.  The
combined impacts of the Washington treatments show that treatment
group members and control group members had similar average earn-
ings in each of the quarters.
 The evidence on whether the bonus offers increased earnings is
also mixed (Table 5.3).  In Illinois, the bonus offer clearly caused a
short-term increase in earnings.  Over the full four-quarter observation
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SOURCE: State UI wage records.
a The estimates are based on regressions that include treatment indicators and other
explanatory variables to control for claimant characteristics, UI benefit parameters,
and local factors.  We excluded observations with earnings greater than $100,000 in
any quarter. 
b Standard errors in parentheses.   * = Statistically significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; *** = statistically significant at the 99 percent
confidence level in a two-tailed test.
c Quarters, 1, 2, and 3 are the first, second, and third full calendar quarters after the ini-
tial UI claim.
d See Table 5.1.
e WBA = Weekly UI benefit amount.
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period, the treatment group members earned $250, or 3.4 percent, more
than control group members.  This difference is statistically significant
at the 90 percent confidence level.  The increase in earnings occurred
primarily in quarters 1 and 2.  The quarterly impact estimates represent
an 11 percent increase in earnings in quarter 1 and a 7 percent increase
in quarter 2.  Both of these quarterly estimates are significant at the 95
percent confidence level.
The magnitude and timing of the estimated earnings impacts in
Illinois are consistent with the findings on UI receipt from the Illinois
experiment.  With respect to the magnitude of the impacts, we demon-
strated in Chapter 4 (Table 4.2) that the Illinois bonus offer reduced
average UI receipt by 1.04 weeks.  If we use this impact to derive an
expected impact on earnings based on the assumption that the 1.04-
week reduction in UI receipt translates directly into a 1.04-week
increase in employment, we find an expected impact on earnings of
$258.7  Our estimated impact for the full four-quarter observation
period, $250, is similar to this expected impact.  With respect to the
timing of the impacts, the large and significant earnings impact in the
second quarter after the initial UI claim implies that the bonus reduced
unemployment among sample members who would have otherwise
stayed unemployed into the second quarter.  Hence, the Illinois bonus
had at least some effect on claimants who faced substantial (up to 6
months) unemployment spells.  This finding is consistent with the sig-
nificant reduction in the rate of benefit exhaustion caused by the Illi-
nois bonus offer, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.8
The estimates for the Pennsylvania experiment are more modest
than the Illinois estimates and are not statistically significant in most
cases.  All but one of the Pennsylvania bonus offers (the low bonus/
short qualification treatment) have a positive estimated impact on earn-
ings over the four-quarter observation period, but none of the estimates
is statistically significant.  The estimated impact of all of the treatments
combined was to increase earnings by an average of $93, or 1.0 per-
cent, per claimant, but this combined effect is also not statistically sig-
nificant.
Despite the lack of consistently significant findings for earnings
impacts, the estimated Pennsylvania impacts are consistent with the
estimated impacts of the Pennsylvania treatments on UI receipt that
were discussed in Chapter 4.  Specifically, the magnitude of the esti-
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mated earnings impacts are similar to what one would expect based on
the magnitude of the estimated UI impacts.  For example, assuming
that the 0.58-week reduction in UI receipt for the combined Pennsylva-
nia treatments translates directly into a 0.58-week increase in employ-
ment, the expected impact of the combined treatments on earnings is
$158 (0.58 times average pre-UI weekly earnings for the control group
of $272).  This expected impact is within the 95 percent confidence
interval (approximately –$199 to $385) of the estimated combined
treatment impact for Pennsylvania discussed above.
The comparison of the estimated UI impacts and the estimated
earnings impacts demonstrates the difficulty in estimating earnings
impacts for the bonus experiments.  Although the Pennsylvania sample
was large and the estimates relatively precise, the estimates are not pre-
cise enough to detect the modest earnings impact that would be consis-
tent with the UI impacts.  Given the standard errors in Table 5.3, the
impact of the combined Pennsylvania treatments would need to be
equal to about $250 per claimant to be statistically significant at the 90
percent confidence level, considerably higher than the $158 impact that
is predicted based on the estimated UI impact as described above.
The Washington findings provide no evidence that the Washington
bonus offers increased the earnings of claimants.  Over the entire
observation period, the treatment group members in Washington
earned $88 less than did the control group members, as shown in Table
5.3.  The estimated impacts of individual treatments on earnings were
generally modest, both in each quarter and over the entire observation
period, and many of these estimated impacts were negative rather than
positive.  The impacts of the most generous bonus offers on earnings
are more positive than the impacts of the less generous bonus offers,
which is consistent with the estimated impacts on UI receipt.   How-
ever, none of the estimated impacts of the individual treatments on
earnings is statistically significant.
The lack of consistently positive impacts on earnings of the Wash-
ington treatments is probably not surprising given that the estimated
impacts of the Washington treatments on UI receipt are small, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.  As in the case of the Pennsylvania estimates, even
though the Washington sample is large and our earnings estimates are
relatively precise, the estimates shown in Table 5.3 are not precise
enough to detect the small earnings impacts that would be consistent
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with the small estimated UI impacts.  If we generated expected earn-
ings impacts based on the estimated UI impacts, these expected
impacts would fall within the 95 percent confidence intervals around
the actual impact estimates.  For example, using the same method as
we used for Pennsylvania, we generate an expected earnings impact for
the combined Washington treatments of $119.9  This expected impact is
well within the 95 percent confidence interval (approximately –$455 to
$279) of the estimated combined treatment impact on earnings in
Washington (the –$88 impact described in the previous paragraph).
The presence of errors in the Washington data, as demonstrated by the
large number of extreme outliers, also makes it difficult to use the wage
records data to detect impacts on earnings.
IMPACTS ON WAGES
Claimants may respond to a reemployment bonus offer by intensi-
fying their job search so that they find a new job quickly enough to
receive the bonus.  Alternatively, a claimant may attempt to speed
reemployment not by intensifying the job search but by relaxing stan-
dards for acceptable job offers.  That is, claimants may, in an effort to
receive a bonus, accept jobs that do not quite match their skills or do
not offer the wages or benefits that they would command in the absence
of the bonus offer.  If such an effect were to occur, it should be consid-
ered a potential cost of the bonus offer since claimants would be
matched to jobs in which they are potentially less productive.
Consider the possibility that claimants sacrifice wages in order to
hasten reemployment and qualify for the bonus.  Such an effect would
have negative long-run consequences if it led to a decrease in lifetime
earnings compared to what would occur in the absence of the bonus.
In this section, we attempt to determine whether the bonus offers
decreased wages at reemployment.  We examine the sample of all
claimants who reported earnings in two consecutive calendar quarters
after their initial UI claim.  This approach is intended to focus our anal-
ysis on a sample of claimants who found reemployment.  We used this
sample of reemployed claimants to estimate the impacts of the treat-
164 Decker, O’Leary, and Woodbury
ments on quarterly wages in the second quarter, or first full quarter, of
employment after the initial UI claim.
In all three experiments, the reemployed treatment group members
had quarterly wages that were similar to the earnings of reemployed
control group members, suggesting that claimants who received a
bonus offer did not sacrifice wages to become reemployed quickly.
The estimated impacts of the combined treatments on wages based on
the differences of means (model 1 in Table 5.4) are modestly positive
but not statistically significant in the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments.  The estimate for the Illinois experiment is negative, but it
is also small and statistically insignificant.
Because the reemployed claimants are not a random sample of all
claimants, the differences in wages between the reemployed treatment
group members and the reemployed control group members do not
necessarily provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of the bonus
offers on wages.  The impact estimates in model 1 of Table 5.4 may
therefore be subject to selection bias because the wage equations can
be estimated only with reemployed claimants.  Selection bias occurs in
the treatment/control comparisons if the reemployed claimants in the
treatment group were either a more or less “select” group than the
reemployed claimants in the control group, who became reemployed in
the absence of the bonus offer.  If the bonus offers induced relatively
high-wage workers to become reemployed more quickly, the difference
in wages between the treatment and control groups would represent an
upwardly biased estimate of the impact of the treatments on wages.  On
the other hand, if the bonus offers induced relatively low-wage workers
to become reemployed more quickly, the difference in wages between
the groups would represent a downward biased estimate of the impact
of the treatments on wages.
 To control for the inherent differences between the reemployed
treatment group members and the reemployed control group members,
we estimated two additional wage models.  The first of these models
(model 2 in Table 5.4) includes additional explanatory variables to con-
trol for race, gender, age, weekly benefit amount (WBA), and base
period earnings.  The second of these models (model 3 in Table 5.4) is
similar to model 2, but the dependent variable is defined as the differ-
ence between post- and pre-layoff quarterly earnings.
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Control group mean 4,281 4,281 454
Sample size 11,454 11,454 11,454
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
a Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test.
b Model 1 uses earnings in the second quarter of earnings after the initial UI claim as
the dependent variable and treatment indicators as explanatory variables.  Model 2 is
identical to model 1, but adds additional explanatory variables to control for race,
gender, age, base period earnings, and WBA.  Model 3 uses the change in quarterly
earnings between the base period before the layoff and the second quarter of earnings
receipt after the layoff as the dependent variable.
c WBA = Weekly UI benefit amount.
Based on these alternative models, it appears that claimants who
received a bonus offer did not accept lower wages, on average, to
become reemployed more quickly.  The estimated impacts of the com-
bined treatments are negative in Pennsylvania and Washington, but the
estimates are small and statistically insignificant.  The estimated
impact of the combined Pennsylvania treatments is either positive or
negative, depending on the model, but the estimates are consistently
small and statistically insignificant.
IMPACTS ON EMPLOYER AND INDUSTRY ATTACHMENT
The bonus offers may have affected the probability that claimants
returned to their previous employer.  Claimants who had the opportu-
nity to receive a reemployment bonus may have foregone the chance of
returning to their previous employer in an effort to become reemployed
within the qualification period.  In addition, the Washington and Penn-
sylvania experiments paid bonuses only to reemployed claimants who
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were not recalled to their old jobs.10   This restriction provided an addi-
tional incentive to break any existing employer attachment.
Evidence from the experiments suggests that the bonus offers gen-
erally reduced the probability of returning to the previous employer.11
Table 5.5 contains the estimated impacts on probability of recall based
on two alternative models: model 1 is based on simple comparisons of
reemployed treatment and control group members, while model 2 con-
trols for other factors, including race, gender, age, previous industry,
base period earnings, WBA, potential benefit duration, recall expecta-
tions, and local office.  Approximately 40 percent of reemployed
claimants in the control group in any of the states had returned to their
previous employer.  Surprisingly, the findings presented in Table 5.5
suggest that the Illinois bonus offer had a larger impact on the proba-
bility of returning to the previous employer than the combined Wash-
ington or Pennsylvania bonus offers.  This finding is surprising because
the Illinois experiment was the only one of the three experiments that
did not have an explicit restriction on bonus payments to claimants
who returned to their previous job.12  Despite this factor, the estimated
impact of the Illinois bonus was to decrease the probability of recall by
an estimated 3 or 4 percentage points, significant at the 95 percent con-
fidence level (model 2 in Table 5.5).
The estimated impact in Pennsylvania was smaller—the combined
treatments reduced the probability of returning to the previous
employer by 1.6 percentage points—and not statistically significant.
Among the individual Pennsylvania treatments, the high bonus (6  ×
WBA) treatments had the largest estimated impacts on employer
attachment (all significant at the 90 or 95 percent confidence level).
Hence, in Pennsylvania the more generous bonus offers appear to have
induced some claimants to take new jobs rather than wait to be recalled
to their previous employer.  The estimated impact of the combined
treatments in Washington was similar to the Pennsylvania impact and
was statistically insignificant in both models.13,14
The bonus offers may induce claimants to not only find jobs with
new employers but also find jobs in new industries.  Such an impact
would occur if the financial incentive inherent in the bonus offer led
claimants to search for jobs in other industries more intensively or
accept jobs in other industries more readily than they would in the
absence of the bonus offer.  Industry codes were available to investigate
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Table 5.5 Estimated Impacts on the Probability
of Return to Previous Employera (percentage points)
Treatment
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Table 5.5 (continued)
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
a Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95 percent confi-
dence level in a two-tailed test; *** = statistically significant at the 99 percent
confidence level in a two-tailed test.
b All estimates are based on linear probability models.  Model 1 includes only treat-
ment indicators as explanatory variables.  Model 2 includes treatment indicators and
other variables to control for race, gender, age, base period earnings, and WBA.
c WBA = Weekly UI benefit amount.
this issue in the Illinois and Washington experiments.  These codes
were derived from the employer identification numbers from the wage
records and UI administrative records.15  We based our investigation on
the two-digit level of industrial classification.
Findings from the Illinois and Washington experiments provide
generally weak evidence that the bonus offers may have reduced the
probability that claimants returned to their previous industry.  About
half of the control group members in either experiment returned to
their previous industry, with the rate being somewhat higher in Wash-
ington.  The impacts of the Illinois treatment and the combined Wash-
ington treatments on the probability of returning to the previous
industry were small and negative (Table 5.6).  In model 2, which
adjusts for individual characteristics, the Illinois treatment reduced the
probability of return to industry by an estimated 1.7 percentage points,
and the combined Washington treatments reduced the probability of
return by 1.0 percentage point.  Neither of these estimates, however, is
significant at conventional confidence levels.   Two of the individual
Washington treatments, WT2 and WT5 (Table 5.6), had significant
impacts on the probability of return, but neither of these treatments is
the most generous treatments in Washington, and neither has a signifi-
cant impact on duration of UI receipt (Chapter 4).  Hence, these data
provide only weak evidence that claimants reduced their UI duration
and received a bonus by increasing their industrial mobility slightly.
 Whether the decreased employer and industry attachment that may
be attributable to the bonus experiments would be considered undesir-
able is unclear.  The effect is undesirable only if claimants, in their
effort to receive the bonus, were so shortsighted in their reemployment
decisions that they lost lifetime earnings by taking jobs that did not
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Table 5.6 Estimated Impacts on the Probability of Return to Previous 
Two-Digit Industrya (percentage points)
Treatment









Control group mean 51.9 51.9
Washington






























Control group mean 56.4 56.4
SOURCE: State UI wage records.
a Standard errors in parentheses.  * = Statistically significant at the 90% confidence
level in a two-tailed test; ** = statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in a
two-tailed test.
b All estimates are based on linear probability models.  Model 1 includes only treat-
ment indicators as explanatory variables.  Model 2 includes treatment indicators and
other variables to control for race, gender, age, base period earnings, and WBA.
c WBA = Weekly UI benefit amount.
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reward the employer- or industry-specific capital accumulated on their
previous jobs.  Presumably, rational claimants would only switch
employers or industries to receive the bonus if the amount of the bonus
compensated for any loss in lifetime earnings inherent in the switch.
CONCLUSION
Although the evidence is somewhat mixed, the three reemploy-
ment bonus experiments generally appear to have increased employ-
ment and earnings modestly.  The clearest impacts on employment and
earnings occurred in Illinois, where the $500 bonus offer increased
earnings by an average of $250, or 3.4 percent, per claimant over the
year following the initial UI claim.  This finding is not surprising given
that the Illinois experiment also had substantial impacts on UI receipt.
The employment and earnings impacts in Pennsylvania were smaller
than in Illinois and not statistically significant.  Finally, the estimated
earnings impacts in Washington were not consistently positive,
although the estimated impacts of the most generous bonus offers were
more positive than the impacts of the less generous offers.
Overall, the findings with respect to employment and earnings are
consistent with the impacts on UI receipt presented in Chapter 4.  The
estimated employment and earnings impacts were modest, as would be
expected given the modest impacts on UI receipt.  In addition, the
experiment with the largest impact on UI receipt (Illinois) also had the
largest impacts on employment and earnings, while the experiment
with the smallest impact on UI receipt (Washington) had the smallest
impacts on employment and earnings.
We found no evidence that claimants responded to the bonus offers
by sacrificing wages to speed their reemployment.  In all three experi-
ments, the reemployed treatment group members and the reemployed
control group members had similar wages on their new jobs, other
things being equal.
 Finally, some claimants appear to have broken attachments with
previous employers or industries to speed their reemployment.  The
clearest effects on employer and industrial mobility occurred in Illi-
nois, where the bonus offer decreased the probability of returning to
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the previous employer by 3 to 4 percentage points and decreased the
probability of returning to the previous industry by about 2 percentage
points.  Similar findings with respect to employer attachment were
found in Pennsylvania, where the most generous bonus offers signifi-
cantly reduced the probability of returning to the previous employer.
The Washington bonuses had negative estimated impacts on both the
probability of returning to the previous employer and the probability of
returning to the previous industry, but the estimates were smaller than
in Illinois and tended to be insignificant.
Notes
1. Earnings data for later quarters are available but not for the full samples.
2. Interview data on earnings were also available for the Pennsylvania experiment
but not for the Washington and Illinois experiments.  Corson et al. (1992) used
both wage records and interview data to investigate earnings in the Pennsylvania
experiment and found that wage records provide adequate information for evalu-
ating the impacts of the bonus offers on earnings.  See Appendix D of Corson et
al. (1992) for a direct comparison of interview and wage records data on earnings.
3. Decker (1989) discussed these and related shortcomings of UI wage records data
based on data from the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration.  He esti-
mated that 9 percent of the claimants in the New Jersey demonstration sample
lived outside New Jersey (and therefore may have been likely to find work outside
New Jersey) at the time of the demonstration, 3 percent became self-employed in
the year after their initial UI claim, and 28 percent received severance pay or a
pension payout from their previous employer.  
4. Investigation of the outliers in the Washington data suggested that they reflect
errors in the data rather than actual receipt of earnings or other forms of compen-
sation.  The outliers for given individuals in given quarters were extremely incon-
sistent with the earnings reported in other quarters for those individuals.
5. Earnings are not adjusted for differences in price levels, so some of the earnings
differences may not represent differences in real earnings.
6. The higher reemployment rates for Washington were due partly to the inclusion of
stand-by recall claimants in the Washington experiment.  Since these claimants
expected to be recalled by their pre-UI employer after a brief period of unemploy-
ment, the inclusion of these claimants in the Washington experiment increased the
overall employment rates for Washington claimants compared with the Illinois
and Pennsylvania experiments, which excluded stand-by recall claimants.  See
Chapter 2 for a full discussion of eligibility requirements in the three experiments.
7. We calculate the expected impact on earnings by multiplying 1.04 weeks by aver-
age weekly earnings in the base period for the control groups, $248.
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8. Decker (1994) examined in detail the impacts of reemployment bonuses on the
short-term and long-term unemployed in the Illinois experiment and the New Jer-
sey UI Reemployment Demonstration.
9. We calculated the expected impact by multiplying the combined treatment impact
on UI weeks (0.40) by average weekly earnings in the base period ($298) in
Washington.
10. In the Washington experiment, bonuses were paid to claimants hired by their pre-
vious employers only if they were hired for different jobs.  In Pennsylvania,
claimants recalled by their previous employers did not receive bonuses, regardless
of the job.
11. Claimants were treated as returning to their previous employer if the identification
number of the employer in the first quarter of earnings matches the identification
number of the separating employer.  If a claimant had multiple employers in the
first quarter of earnings, we used the employer that paid the most earnings in the
quarter.
12. Among those Illinois claimants who eventually received a bonus payment, 21 per-
cent had returned to their previous employer.
13. Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992) also used data from a follow-up interview
to investigate the probability of returning to the previous employer.  Estimates
based on these interview data suggest that the bonus offers significantly reduced
the probability of recall by 6 percent.  As pointed out by Spiegelman, O’Leary,
and Kline, the interview data differ from the wage records by explicitly identify-
ing the previous and new employers, instead of relying on the matching of codes
from the wage records.  Interview data may be less accurate due to errors in self-
reporting, however, and the sample of survey respondents is a smaller and proba-
bly nonrandom subset of the claimant population.
14. Anderson (1992) considered the impact of a reemployment bonus on recall in her
study of the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstra-
tion.  She found that the bonus offer in New Jersey did not reduce recall rates sig-
nificantly.
15. In Illinois and Washington, the industry code is part of the employer identification
number.  In Pennsylvania, the employer identification number does not contain an
industry code.
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